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The main objective of this paper has been to review Pakistan’s historical experience in 
agricultural development in terms of growth, income distribution, and rural poverty. While the 
long-term growth rates between 1949-50 and 1994-95 were satisfactory, the variations around 
the average have been rather too large over the various decades. Beginning with a stagnating 
sector of the 1950s, agriculture witnessed record growth rates during the Sixties. This was 
followed by the lowest growth rates of the early Seventies, and acceleration in the second half 
of the Seventies. The experience since 1979-80 has been mixed, but the growth rates have been 
rather low through the Eighties and the Nineties. The trends in income distribution and poverty 
varied directly in relation to the agricultural growth rates, especially when they were in excess 
of the threshold level of 4.5–5.0 percent per annum. In general, a growth rate of 5.0 percent or 
higher has induced positive changes in income distribution and poverty. In view of this 
positive association, the pursuit of a high growth policy in agriculture should guide Pakistan’s 
future development strategy. The efficiency of resource use, a greater dependence on modern 
technologies, and a minimisation of government intervention in the market mechanism are the 
essential pillars of the high growth strategy. 
 
Agricultural development in Pakistan since the Fifties is the subject of discussion 
in this paper, which is divided into 5 sections. Section 2 follows Section 1 and reviews 
the historical growth pattern of the agricultural sector. The trends in income distribution 
and poverty are related in Section 3. In Section 4 the causes and consequences 
underlying this development experience are discussed with an emphasis on technology 
and agricultural prices. The concluding section makes policy recommendations for better 
prospects of agricultural development. 
 
II.  HISTORICAL GROWTH OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Because of the primacy of the agricultural sector, sustained growth of production 
in agriculture has been a cherished goal of Pakistan’s economy throughout its history. 
The relative growth performance of agriculture and subsectors is summarised in Table 1.  
Two broad conclusions can be derived from the table. Firstly, the agricultural 
sector has maintained a long-term growth rate of 3.28 percent per annum between 1949- 
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Output Trends and Growth Rates of Agriculture and Its Sub-sectors from 1949–50 to 1994–95 
  Value-added at Constant Factor Cost of 
1959-60 (Rs Billion)  Output (Million Tonnes) of Livestock  Products  (000 Tonnes)  Eggs  
Years 






A. Output Levels 
 
1949-50  6.60  4.25  2.29  3.92  0.22  7.85  0.81  –     –     –     –    
1954-55  6.95  4.32  2.25  3.19  0.28  8.84  0.84  –     –     –     –    
1959-60  7.71  4.77  2.84  3.91  0.29  10.64  1.00  –     –     –     –    
1964-65  9.28  6.02  3.12  4.59  0.38  18.67  1.35  –     –     –     –    
1969-70  12.57 8.92 3.44 7.29  0.54  26.37  2.40  7800  554  12  583 
1974-75  13.07 9.14 3.80 7.67  0.51  21.34  2.31  8173  622  34  1159 
1979-80  15.83 11.20  4.42 10.59  0.73 27.50 3.13  9075  740  49  2094 
1984-85  18.60 12.75  5.58 11.70  1.01 32.14 3.32  10856  980  99  4093 
1989-90  23.26 15.29  7.51 14.32  1.46 35.49 3.22  14723  1350  157  4670 
1994-95  28.21 17.74  9.91 17.00  1.48 47.17 3.45  18946  1806  308  5929 
1995-96  29.70 18.81 10.47 16.91  1.80 46.23 3.97  18919  1916  335  5757 
1996-97  29.91 18.40 11.15 16.38  1.60 42.00 4.30  20950  2032  385  5915 
 
B. Annual Growth Rates (%age) 
 
1950-55  1.01  0.33  2.35  (4.04)  4.94  2.40  0.73  –    –    –    –   
1955-60  2.10  1.91  2.18  4.15  0.70  3.78  3.55  –    –    –    –   
1960-65  3.78  4.76  1.90  3.26  5.55  11.90  6.34  –    –    –    –   
1965-70  6.26  8.18  1.97  9.69  7.28  7.15  12.19  –    –    –    –   
1970-75  0.78 0.49 2.01 1.02 (1.14)  (4.14)  (0.76)  0.94  2.34  19.42 14.73 
1975-80  3.91 4.15 3.07 6.67  7.44 5.20  6.26  2.12  4.36  7,58 12.56 
1980-85  3.28 2.63 4.77 2.01  6.71 3.17  1.19  3.65  4.94  15.10 14.34 
1985-90  4.57 3.70 6.12 4.12  7.65 2.00  (0.61)  6.28  6.62  9.66  2.67 
1990-95  3.93 3.02 5.70 3.49  0.27  12.89  1.39  5.17  5.99  14.43  4.88 
1995-97  2.97  1.84  6.07  (1.84) 3.98  (5.64)  11.64 5.05 6.07  11.80  (0.12) 
1950–97  3.28 3.23 3.43 3.31  4.33 4.06  3.27  3.61  4.84  13.16  9.72 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1986 and 1996a). 
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50 and 1996-97.  The annual growth of the crop production subsector has been slightly 
lower; and that of livestock, wheat, cotton and sugarcane slightly higher, than the 
average growth rate.  
Secondly, the growth pattern in agriculture has been patchy: it has been enviable 
during certain periods but disappointing in others. The table shows that the growth rate 
of the value added by agriculture barely exceeded 1.0 percent per annum during the 
early 1950s and 2.1 percent during 1954-55 to 1959-60. The acceleration of growth 
initiated in the Fifties continued into the Sixties and agricultural value-added exhibited 
an annual growth rate of 3.78 percent and 6.26 percent, respectively, during the first and 
second halves. Lacking any change in livestock sector, the accelerating growth rates 
were the result of rising  growth rates of crop production. The first and second halves of 
1960s had respective annual growth rates of crop output of 4.8 to 8.2 percent. In the 
latter half of 1960s rice, wheat, cotton and sugarcane had annual increases of 12.2, 9.7, 
7.3 and 7.2 percent per year. 
During early Seventies the annual growth rate in agriculture plummeted to the 
historically lowest level of 0.78 percent. While crop production had a growth rate of 
0.49 percent, output of rice, cotton and sugarcane fell persistently. With the exception of 
poultry, growth was equally disappointing in livestock sector. However, the agricultural 
growth revived in the second half of the Seventies and crop output and livestock 
registered respective growth rates of more than 4.0 and 3.0 percent. 
Since the 1980s, livestock and non-cereal crops emerged as the prime movers of 
agricultural growth. Against 3.28 percent annual growth rate of agriculture, growth of 
livestock exceeded 4.77 percent and that of cotton 6.71 percent. By contrast respective 
growth rates of crop sector and cereal crops were less than 2.63 and 2.0 percent. During 
the period of 1984-85 and 1989-90, the production of cotton and livestock witnessed a 
further acceleration and contributed to more rapid agricultural growth (4.57 percent) 
than in the previous period. Despite some recovery in wheat, the growth rates of 
sugarcane and rice remained very low. In the 1990s, the growth rates fell further to less 
than 4.0 and 3.0 percent per annum respectively between 1989-90 and 1994-95 and 
1994-95 and 1996-97. The high growth rates of the sugarcane and livestock sectors had 
a positive, and a slower growth of cotton, rice and wheat a negative, effect on the overall 
agricultural growth in the 1990s.  
 
III.  TRENDS IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
AND POVERTY 
The time-series data on income distribution and poverty are not as comprehensive 
as those on agricultural production. The Household Income and Expenditure Surveys 
can profitably be used to trace the changes in the patterns of income distribution and 
poverty. Table 2 presents the relevant data on the inter-temporal income distribution and 
poverty trends in rural Pakistan. Chaudhry and Chaudhry  596 
It is clear from Table 2 that the patterns of income distribution and poverty in 
rural Pakistan have witnessed considerable changes from time to time. The rural incomes 
became more skewed during early Sixties. Improvements in rural income distribution 
occurred during 1963-64 to 1970-71, as concentration ratios fell from 0.35 to 0.29. A 
reversal of this trend began in 1971-72; and the rural income inequalities grew until 
1984-85. Although rural income differentials narrowed down between 1984-85 and 
1987-88, the Gini Coefficients rose to 0.41 and 0.37 respectively, the highest ever 




Income Concentration Ratios and Poverty Levels in Rural Pakistan 
from 1959-60 to 1990-91 
 
Gini Coefficients 
Rural Population Below the Calorie-based 
Poverty-line 
Year 
Based on Household 
Income 
As a Percent of Total 
Rural Population 
Rural Poor (Million) 
1959  0.35  –    –   
1961  0.36  –    –   
1963-64 0.35  43.10  16.53 
1966-67  0.32  –    –  
1968-69 0.29  25.10  10.76 
1969-70 0.30  26.00  11.40 
1970-71 0.29  9.25  4.15 
1971-72 0.31  19.19  8.82 
1979 0.33  19.00  11.48 
1984-85 0.34  21.10  14.33 
1985-86  0.33  –  –   
1986-87  0.32  –  –   
1987-88 0.31  19.60  14.30 
1990-91 0.41  20.60  16.06 
1992-93 0.37  20.40  16.36 
Source:  Gini Ratios are from [Chaudhry (1982); and Government of Pakistan (1996a and 1997)]; while the data 
about Poverty Levels are from [Allauddin (1975); Ercelawn (1988) and Malik (1994)]. 
1The sudden rise in Gini may partly be attributed to variation in data used in the calculation of 
Gini Coefficients. Prior to 1990, the grouped data formed the basis of calculation but ungrouped 
household data were used for calculating Gini ratios for 1990-91 and 1992-93. Pakistan’s Agricultural Development 
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The poverty level exhibited more or less the same trend as rural income 
distribution, though with less abrupt changes. This is to expected as poverty studies are 
based on expenditure which can be financed out of savings or borrowing. In 1963-64, 
poverty was widespread as more than 43 percent of the rural population suffered from 
varying degrees of poverty. The incidence of poverty fell consistently through the Sixties 
and was confined to 9 percent of the population by 1970-71. Relative poverty 
accentuated between 1970-71 and 1984-85 reaching a level of 21.1 percent. It, however, 
has tended to stabilise at around 20 percent in the late Eighties and early Nineties 
[Chaudhry (1996)]. 
There were at least 16.5 million rural poor in Pakistan during 1963-64. The 
number fell to around 11.0 million in 1968-69 and 1969-70. A sharp decline in absolute 
poverty occurred during 1970-71, but it has risen consistently since then with the result 
that the number of poor in 1992-93 were about the same as in 1963-64. 
 
IV.  FACTORS IN GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION 
Pakistan’s long-term experience in agricultural growth and distribution seems to 
be rich enough to allow some hypothesis testing. Such an analysis should help 
appropriate policy-making, to redirect the government’s efforts, and enhancing the 
welfare of the people. Among the many hypotheses that can be tested on the basis of this 
experience, the most appropriate ones are listed below. 
Firstly, we can ask: is there a trade-off between agricultural growth and income 
distribution? Secondly, what factors, other than the growth rate of output, may have 
been responsible for changing the trends in agricultural growth and income distribution? 
Thirdly, what has been the effect of agricultural price policy on growth, distribution and 
poverty alleviation?  
 
Growth and Distribution in Agriculture 
The policy of growth maximisation was widely criticised during the Sixties for its 
adverse effects on income distribution, and social, political and economic stability. 
However, several recent studies show that rapid growth of agricultural sector has been 
no less than a blessing for Pakistan. Naqvi (1994), for example, has shown that a sturdy 
agricultural growth is essential for rapid growth of national income, for attaining 
macroeconomic stability, and for securing an improvement in distributive justice and a 
reduction in rural poverty. According to Naqvi (1992) agriculture must maintain a 
growth rate of more than 5.0 percent in order to ensure achievement of the above desired 
objectives. That a 5.0 percent annual growth of agriculture output is an absolute 
necessity in Pakistan has further been enunciated by Mellor (1988) in terms of its 
implications for the effective employment of growing labour force. On the basis of 
population growth rates, an income elasticity of demand for food of 0.6 and a per capita Chaudhry and Chaudhry  598 
income growth rate of 2-3 percent, Chaudhry (1994) argued that food output must grow 
at an annual rate of 5.0 percent to attain food self-sufficiency on a sustainable basis.  
Can such  high growth rates be achieved and sustained in the future? It may be 
recalled that Pakistan has had a long-term growth rate of nearly 3.3 percent per annum 
between 1949-50 and 1996-97. It may also be recalled that the average annual growth 
rate exceeded the required growth rate during 1960s and was close to it between 1984-
85 and 1989-90. In view of this fact the current agricultural growth can easily be stepped 
up to the required growth rate by simple manipulation of agricultural policy. 
 
Technology and Growth 
It has been shown that agricultural growth may not be destabilising, and that the 
Green Revolution would have made a positive contribution to higher growth rate of 
agriculture. There is considerable evidence that private tubewell installations led to a 50 
percent increase in the cropping intensity [Muhammad (1965)]. The shorter duration of 
the High-Yielding Varieties (HYVs) of wheat and rice and the availability of chemical 
fertilisers has produced similar results [Gill (1973)]. The quickness of operations 
permitted by tractor cultivation augmented the cropping-intensity effects of tubewells 
and HYVs [Lawrence (1970)]. The yield-increasing effect of the above technologies 
was equally important. Each of the tubewells and HYVs of wheat and rice raised crop 
yields by 50 percent [Muhammad (1965) and Gill (1973)]. The new varieties of cotton, 
introduced in the 1980s, have a yield potential of 3-4 times the traditional varieties 
[Chaudhry (1994)]. 
 
Green Revolution and Inequalities 
A second hypothesis that needs to be tested is the (alleged) negative effect of the 
Green Revolution on rural income distribution. The argument is based on growing 
income differences among; (1) the small, and the large farms, (2) the farm sector and the 
landless workers, and (3) the irrigated and unirrigated areas. These issues are discussed 
below if only to portray a true picture. 
 
(a)  Inter-farm Income Disparities  
In line with the existing literature, the changes in farm income are a function of 
the changes in land distribution and those in farm productivity. Assuming proportional 
changes in the productivity of the small and large farms, the changes in income 
distribution would follow the trend of land distribution.
2 As measured by the operational 
and ownership holdings, land distribution trends over the years are depicted in Table 3. 
2For the purposes of this study, small farms include all farms under 12.5 acres and large farms 
mean farms with farm area exceeding 25 acres. Pakistan’s Agricultural Development 
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Table 3 
Changes in the Distribution of Agricultural Land for Census Years 
   Land Concentration Relations: Based on 
Agricultural   Ownership Holdings  Operational Holdings  
Census Year  Revenue Factors Census Data  Census Data 
1960  0.640    –  0.617 
1972 0.570  0.658  0.518 
1980 0.510  0.643  0.535 
1990    –  0.654  0.583 
Source: [Naqvi, Khan and Chaudhry (1989) and Government of Pakistan (1993)]. 
 
It should be clear that land distribution in Pakistan consistently moved in favour 
of the small farmers between 1960 and 1980.  Both the revenue records and the census 
data show a rapid improvement in the distribution of ownership holdings.  The same 
trend is reflected in the distribution of operational area during 1959-60 and 1972, but 
with a slight reversal occurring between 1972 and 1990. During the 1980s both the 
ownership and operational holdings show a deterioration of land distribution. These 
trends, especially during the Sixties, indicate that the Green Revolution may not have led 
to any large-scale land purchases, land renting or increased owner cultivation. While the 
improvements in land distribution continued to be guided by the Islamic inheritance 
laws, its deterioration in the Seventies and Eighties must have been induced by land 
purchases by the industrialists with a view to saving taxes on industrial profits 
[Government of Pakistan (1993a)]. 
There is an impressive body of empirical evidence  which postulates an inverse 
size-productivity relationship in agriculture [Cornia (1985); Dorner (1972); Johnston and 
Tomich (1985) and Ruttan (1969)]. Despite contrary theoretical suggestions, empirical 
evidence in Pakistan lends support to the inverse relationship between farm size and 
agricultural productivity [Chaudhry (1982); Naqvi, Khan and Chaudhry (1989); Sharif et 
al. (1986) and Hai (1997)]. Some of factual information in this regard has been depicted 
in Table 4. 
It is apparent from Table 4 that the gross productivity of the small farms has been 
consistently higher than that of the large ones. The last column of the table indicates that 
the small farms have maintained an edge over the large farms in the growth of land 
productivity between 1965-66 to 1995-96. In the light of the above, there is no room for 
the assertion that the large farms overtook the small farms in farm productivity under the 
Green Revolution. Indeed, the differences in the adoption rates of various modern 
technologies between the two groups have narrowed with passage of time.  Chaudhry and Chaudhry  600 
Table 4 
Gross Productivities per Farm Acre for Small and Large Farms 
   Value of Output (Rs) per Farm Acre  Small as Percentage of Large 
Year  Small Farms  Large Farms  Farm’s Productivity 
1965-66   363   205  177.1 
1966-67           515   250  206.0 
1967-68           561   230  243.9 
1968-69           552   250  220.8 
1969-70           657   349   188.2 
1970-71           700   332  210.8 
1973-74           526   303  173.6 
1981-82         1719  1031  166.7 
1995-96         7301  3419  209.3 
Source: [Naqvi, Khan and Chaudhry (1989) and Hai (1997)]. The figures reported here have been adjusted for 
land use intensities of the two groups and differ to that extent from incomes reported in the source.  
 
It may be argued that, because of the lumpiness of investment, the ownership of 
the mechanical technologies like tubewells and tractors would be heavily concentrated in 
the hands of large farmers.  Apparently this seems to be the case. According to the 1980 
Census of Agriculture [Government of Pakistan (1983)], nearly 59 percent of the tractors 
and about 39 percent of the tubewells were in the ownership of large farmers. By 
contrast, the small farmers owned only 16 percent of the tractors and 35 percent of the 
tubewells. However, if measured in terms of per unit of farm area, the disparity of 
ownership of mechanical inputs between small and large farmers is considerably 
reduced.  Furthermore, the relative differences in the physical ownership of mechanical 
inputs may not be uniquely related to inter-farm differences in productivity levels and 
the efficiency of resource use.  The reason is simple.  The use of these inputs may not 
always be positively related to the ownership pattern. This is because the practice of 
selling tubewell water and the institution of contract-ploughing at competitive rates can 
increase the small farmer’s access to tubewell and tractor services.  Accounting for this 
fact, nearly 35 and 32 percent of the small farmers were users of tractors and tubewells. 
By contrast, the respective percentages were 44 and 33 for the large farmers. 
As regards the current adoption rates of bio-chemical technology, there are no 
known differences between the small farms and the large farms. Although the leading 
role of the large farms in the adoption of HYVs cannot be denied, there is considerable 
evidence that the differences in the adoption rates of the two groups had at least 
disappeared by the early Seventies [Chaudhry (1982)].  It may be interesting to note that 
the HYVs of wheat accounted for 68 percent of wheat acreage in 1980, on both the  
 Pakistan’s Agricultural Development 
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small farms and the large farms. By contrast, the small farms devoted nearly 54.0 percent 
of their rice area to HYVs of rice compared to 44.0 percent on large farms [Government 
of Pakistan (1983)]. 
Not very different has been the experience with chemical fertilisers.  There were 
wide differences in the rates of fertiliser application on large farms and the small farms 
in the Sixties [Chaudhry (1982)].  However, such differences had been greatly reduced 
by the early 1980s [Naqvi, Khan and Chaudhry (1989)].  
One of the most probable reasons for a somewhat lesser use of the modern inputs 
on the small farms relative to the large ones lies in the fact that the small farms, guided 
by their resource endowments, prefer to make a more intensive use of some of the 
traditional inputs. For example, although tractors may enable the large farms to 
undertake tillage operations with precision, small farms can do the same in better ways 
with greater inputs of human labour and animal power in addition to their access to 
tractors.  According to available evidence [Naqvi, Khan, and Chaudhry (1989); Herring 
and Chaudhry (1974) and Chaudhry (1982)], the labour input per unit of land for the 
small farms is, at least, twice as much as that for the large farms.  Similarly, the bullock-
power input of the small farmers  was 4.0 times that of the large farmers.  Although the 
small farmers have a somewhat limited access to tubewell water, their proportionate 
irrigated area has historically exceeded that of the large farmers, probably because they 
tend to use water more efficiently.  This would be particularly true if the small farmers 
had only a limited access to surface and ground water supplies.  According to the 1990 
Census of Agriculture [Government of Pakistan (1993)], the proportionate irrigated area 
of the small farmers was close to 80.5 percent as against 72.8 percent of that of the large 
farmers. A somewhat lesser use of chemical fertiliser on the small farms is perhaps more 
than offset by their higher manorial input.  Also, the small farmers use twice as much 
farmyard manure per acre as is done by large farmers [Chaudhry (1982)]. As farm-yard 
manure is rich in plant nutrients, its greater use would be instrumental in enabling the 
small farmers to secure a higher and better soil-nutrient balance than is obtained by large 
farmers, who solely depend on chemical fertilisers. 
 
(b)  Incomes of Rural Landless and Landowners 
Apart from the relative income changes of the small farms and the large farms, 
the pattern of income distribution is critically shaped by the relative growth rates of the 
incomes of the landless and the landowners, which are in turn determined by the changes 
in employment and wages in agriculture. This issue is discussed in the following pages. 
  On the basis of Labour Force Surveys, Chaudhry and Chaudhry (1992) have 
shown that the employment rates in rural Pakistan were above 98 percent during the 
1960s and early 1970s, fell below the 97 percent level in the late Seventies and the 
Eighties, and exceeded the 94-95 percent level in the 1990s.  
  Chaudhry and Chaudhry  602 
  The changes in the demand for, and the supply of, labour in agriculture determine 
long term trends in rural employment. While the labour supply is a function of the 
growth of rural labour force, its demand depends directly on the growth of agricultural 
output. The growth of labour force in agriculture between 1951–81 has been estimated at 
2.10 percent per annum [Rukanuddin and Farooqui (1988)], and at 1.95 percent between 
1979-80 and 1994-95 [Government of Pakistan (1996)]. Using the estimates of the 
employment elasticity of agricultural growth given in Mellor (1988), it is not difficult to 
estimate the growth of labour demand in agriculture. Given this elasticity, agriculture 
must at least maintain a growth rate of 3.0 – 3.5 percent per year. However as the growth 
rates of agriculture remained below these threshold levels during the 1950s, the 1970s, 
the early 1980s and the 1990s, a deterioration in employment situation should be 
expected. On the contrary, the high growth rates in the 1960s and the second the half of 
the 1980s may be compatible with an increasing competition in the rural labour market. 
Needless to add that a large growth of demand for agricultural labour was the result of 
technological breakthroughs in agriculture like the Green Revolution of the Sixties and 
the HYVs of cotton during the late 1980s [Chaudhry and Chaudhry (1992)]. 
  The intertemporal trend of rural wages is another factor in determining rural 
income distribution. The relevant data are given in Table 5.  
    
Table 5 
Trends in Agricultural Wages from 1959-60 to 1994-95 
Year 
Agricultural Wage 







 1959-60   1.36   100   1.36    – 
 1964-65   1.92   112.53   1.71   4.69 
 1969-70   3.00   126.96   2.36   6.65 
 1974-75   7.53   256.49   2.94   4.49 
 1979-80  13.30   392.80   3.39   2.89 
 1984-85  21.93   585.34  3.75   2.04 
 1989-90  32.62   709.95   4.60   4.17 
 1994-95  56.00  1290.74   4.34  –1.12 
Source: [Chaudhry and Chaudhry (1992); Pakistan Labour Gazette (Various Years); Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin (Various Years); and Government of Pakistan (1996a)] 
 
Several interesting conclusions follow from the table. The nominal daily-wage 
rate in 1959-60 was indeed low, not exceeding Rs 1.36 per day. It took 10 years to 
double, but a redoubling of these rates took just five years between 1969-70 and 1974-
75. A nearly three-fold increase seems to have occurred during each of ten-year periods  
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beginning with 1974-75 and 1984-85. In contrast, when the real GDP deflators is used, 
the real wages in agriculture, show an inconsistent and varying intertemporal trend. The 
growth was the fastest during Sixties, exceeding 6.6 percent per annum during the 
second half of the decade. The annual growth rates declined and averaged around 4.5, 
2.9 and 2.0 percent respectively during first and second halves of the Seventies and the 
early 1980s. While the real wages grew at an annual rate of 4.2 percent during 1984-85 
to 1989-90, they began to decline at the rate of 1.1 percent in the 1990s. 
On the basis of the rates of increase in agricultural employment (2.00 percent) 
and the real wage, the growth rate of the ‘wage fund’ (defined as the product of number 
of persons employed in agriculture and the going wage rate) can be calculated and 
compared with the estimates of value added in agriculture to draw its implications for 
rural income distribution and poverty. Going by these comparisons, the income 
distribution and poverty witnessed considerable improvement during the 1960s and 
second half of the 1980s; but the trend reversed over the 1969-70 to 1984-85 and the 
1989-90 to 1994-95 period. 
 
(c) The State of Regional Disparities 
It was argued in the late Sixties that the regional income distribution would 
inevitably worsen because the Green Revolution technologies were heavily concentrated 
in the most prosperous province of Punjab with well-developed irrigation system to the 
total exclusion of poorest regions like Balochistan, the barani areas were supposed to 
have least access to assured water supply [Falcon (1970) and Hamid and Hussain 
(1974)]. These arguments have, however been widely challenged in the more recent 
literature [Pinstrup-Anderson (1985) and Chaudhry and Iqbal (1989)]. At any rate, 
whatever validity such argument had for the pioneer adopters of these technologies the 
same may not hold for the late-comers, who tend to adopt the technologies more rapidly 
once their benefits are fully demonstrated. In fact, it has been shown that, following the 
Punjab’s example, other provinces and the barani areas have adopted the Green 
Revolution technologies at an even faster rate [Chaudhry and Iqbal (1989)]. 
The question is: have the benefits of Green Revolution been concentrated in the 
Punjab relative to Balochistan and the barani areas? In the absence of any published 
statistics on regional incomes, the question can be investigated in the light of the yield 
trends of wheat and rice crops widely grown in all the above regions. Table 6 furnishes 
the necessary details. 
The table makes clear that, contrary to the notions held in the 1960s, the Green 
Revolution has had a much greater success in Balochistan and in the barani areas than in 
the Punjab. While the wheat yields doubled in Punjab between 1964-65 and 1994-95, 
they tripled or tetraploid in Balochistan and barani areas. And even though rice is not 
grown in the barani areas, the rice yields have at least doubled in Balochistan as against 
the stagnation in the Punjab. Chaudhry and Chaudhry  604 
Table 6 
Wheat and Rice Yields in the Punjab, Balochistan and Barani Areas 
for Selected Years since 1964-65 
  Crop Yields (Kgs. per Hectare) of: 
 Wheat  Rice 
Years Punjab  Balochistan  Barani  Punjab Balochistan 
  1964-65  1020   600    –  1190   980 
  1969-70  1360   770   397  1580   990 
  1974-75  1490   980   572  1520  1110 
  1979-80  1598  1229   877  1287  2223 
  1984-85  1610  1576   780  1370  2762 
  1989-90  1882  1902  1033  1157  2618 
  1994-95  2153  2320  1129  1257  1911 
Source: Government of Pakistan (1981, 1996). 
 
Agricultural Price Policy and Development 
The next question to be addressed is: are prices important in shaping agricultural 
development and can non-price factors play their usual role in the absence of 
remunerative prices? There is worldwide evidence that prices play a crucial role in 
agricultural development. In particular, the long-term trends in agricultural commodity 
prices relative to input prices influence expectations, investment and technology and 
hence the growth of agricultural production [Timmer (1988)]. Also, stable and 
remunerative prices of farm products are associated with a reduction of risk and 
uncertainty; and they augment entrepreneurial skills of the farming community [Schultz 
(1978)]. Finally, the movements in the intersectoral terms of trade influence the 
unemployment rate, the wage good prices, the pattern of income distribution, and the 
level of social welfare [Brown (1978)]. The conclusion seems to be that the non-price 
factors (technological and institutional) are not a substitute for an effective price 
mechanism. For example, Bale and Lutz (1981) highlight the fact that the level of 
agricultural production depends not so much on technical considerations but, in large 
measure, on what governments do to agriculture. According to Schultz (1978) whenever 
the farm product is underpriced, even though superior varieties of crops are at hand, the 
adoption rate is at best partial.  In the same vein, Johnston and Cownie (1969) have 
remarked that the application of chemical fertilisers will depend on optimal grain-
fertiliser price ratios. Schultz (1965) has categorically stated that when the price of 
fertiliser is far above the prices of farm products, no extension programme can induce 
the farmers to use additional quantities of fertiliser. Pakistan’s Agricultural Development 
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As is well known, Pakistan has always followed a policy of intervention in the 
price mechanism, to the point of subverting it. In the Fifties, for example, most of the 
agricultural commodities were subjected to compulsory procurement at substantially less 
than the world prices. However, this policy was relaxed in the 1960s and the government 
began to guarantee above-world prices of agricultural commodities, along with liberal 
subsidies on fertilisers, pesticides, tubewells, tractors and improved seeds of agricultural 
commodities [Kuhnen (1989)]; but the policy was reversed again in the beginning of 
1970s, and the prices of agricultural commodities were reduced to less than world levels, 
while those of fertilisers were tripled [Haque (1993)]. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a different set of conditions determined the fate of 
agricultural price policy.  Under the World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programme, 
the government subsidies on pesticides, seeds and mechanisation were withdrawn and 
the subsidy on fertiliser was to be phased out. At the same time, in view of expected 
increases of prices and rising profits on major inputs the sales of substandard fertilisers 
and pesticides, black marketing and underbagging became the standard practices. To 
avoid agitation from the urban consumers and industrialists, the governments in power 
continued to maintain agricultural commodity prices well below the world prices.  This 
has been the conclusion of all the studies undertaken during the Eighties and the Nineties 
[Chaudhry and Kayani (1991); Dorosh and Valdes (1990); Ender (1992); Faruquee 
(1995); Longmire and Debord (1993) and Government of Punjab (1991)]. Table 7 sums 
up the situation since 1979-80.  
It follows from Table 7 that, while nominal protection coefficients moved up and 
down randomly, the underpricing of agricultural commodities has remained a consistent 
policy.  As a consequence, the resource transfer from agriculture (net of input subsidies 
and government expenditure on agriculture and water) has greatly increased: it was Rs 
11 billion until about mid-Eighties, averaged around Rs 20 billion during the second half 
of the decaded, has been well above Rs 30 billion during 1990–93, and reached an all-
time high figure of Rs 66 billion in 1994-95. 
While the above resource outflows are large enough to dry up any investment 
potential of the farm sector, the story does not end here. In view of the faster increases in 
input prices relative to those of final goods, agriculture has faced low and falling rates of 
profits [Afzal et al. (1992)] in sharp contrast to rising and substantially higher profit rates 
of industrial sector [Government of Punjab (1991)]. Given this state of affairs, it is only 
rational on the part of the marginal investor to disinvest in agriculture and redirect 
investible funds into the industrial sector. 
As appropriate incentives are a sine qua non for rapid agricultural growth, the 
favourable price policy of the Sixties did induce heavy private investments, which led to 
a rapid growth in agriculture; but as the price incentives became less favourable during 
the 1980s  and 1990s, they induced falling growth rates of agricultural crops. In addition  Table 7 
Extent of Underpricing of Agricultural Commodities and Resource Transfers from Agriculture, 1979–80 to 1994–95 
   Nominal  Protection  Coefficients 
Gross Transfer 
from    Input Subsidies (Rs Million) in Agriculture on: 
Govt.   
Expenditure 
Years 
















1979–80  0.57  0.57  0.28  0.47  0.38  12847  2455    297   116     –16  3121   4891   4835 
1980–81  0.51  0.47  0.32  0.41  0.39  18665  2448    338   180     –88  2898   4956  10809 
1981–82  0.68  0.44  0.29  0.43  0.50  18128  1750    416   265     –11  2444   6235   9449 
1982–83  0.60  0.50  0.33  0.74  0.73  15029  1948    437   349   –100  2658   7297   5074 
1983–84  0.50  0.37  0.33  0.73  0.77  19707  1466    661   524   –153  2498   6179  11080 
1984–85  0.52  0.39  0.25  0.56  1.29  20546  1500    828   543    103  2974   6461  11111 
1985–86  0.69  0.51  0.24  1.89  0.94  17313  2409   1005   448     16  3894   9024   4395 
1986–87   0.76  0.43  0.24  1.96  1.25  20038  1284   1234   551    375  3444    444 
1987–88  0.43  0.41  0.28  0.67  1.41  40162  1995   1352   785   1112  5259   31  26872 
1988–89  0.49 0.41 0.29  0.47 1.09  35059  2415   1154  1009    1139  5720    7379  21960 
1989–90  0.34 0.39 0.33  0.41 0.47  72226  1257   1028  1207    1380  4872    8452  58902 
1990–91  0.39 0.57 0.53  1.19 0.62  57614  1248   1545  1526    1625  6220    9857  41537 
1991–92  0.47 0.52 0.59  1.10 0.74  51591  1191   2701  1744    1796  7512    9446  34633 
1992–93  0.55 0.53 0.58  0.79 0.77  44354    810   3111  1993    1724  7639  11922  24793 
1993–94  0.55  0.69  0.53  0.93  0.82  43543   805   2565  1980    330  5680  14429  23434 
1994–95  0.40  0.60  0.66  1.01  0.59  87746    79   2938  1986    330  5333  16113  66300 
1995–96  0.48 0.47 0.71  0.77 0.58  77414  0    NA  0    NA  NA  16508  NA 
1996–97  0.57 0.65 0.60  0.95 0.79  56144  0    NA  0    NA  NA  17487  NA 
  
Source: [Chaudhry (1995). Chaudhry and Maan (1993) and Chaudhry and Sahibzada (1995)]. 
Nominal protection coefficients represent the ratios of procurement to the corresponding import/export parity prices and net transfers equal to gross transfers minus 
subsidies and government expenditure on agriculture and water. 
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to the obvious repercussions for agriculture, the unhelpful price policy in vogue since 
1980 has had adverse effects on the landless and rural poor as well. A growth rate of 2-3 
percent of agriculture crops is highly inadequate to absorb the growing labour force and 
the rising unemployment is likely to induce large undesirable effects on income 
distribution and rural poverty. Low agricultural commodity prices also tend to 
accentuate poverty and income differentials among the farmers for at least two reasons. 
First, the implicit taxation of agriculture in the form of the low prices of agricultural 
produce increases the skewness of post-tax disposable incomes. Second, the impact of 
the increase in input prices on output is likely to be much worse on the small farmers 
relative to the big farmers because of the former’s risk-averse character. It has been 
noted, for example, that small farms—those with a farm size of less than 5.0 acres— 
tend to reduce fertiliser input by 2.4 percent with each 1.0 percent increase in 
fertiliser prices in contrast to price elasticity of demand for fertiliser of only 0.6 
percent on large farms [NFDC (1994)]. It is thus not surprising that an unfavourable 
price policy in agriculture, since 1980, was responsible not only for the slower 
growth of agricultural output but also for worsening income distribution and poverty 
levels. 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main objective of this paper has been to review Pakistan’s historical 
experience in agricultural development in terms of growth, income distribution and rural 
poverty. While the long-term growth rates between 1949-50 and 1994-95 have been 
satisfactory, the variations around the average have been rather too large over the 
various decades. Beginning with a stagnating sector of the 1950s, agriculture witnessed 
record growth rates during the Sixties. This was followed by the lowest growth rates of 
the early Seventies, and then acceleration in the second half of the Seventies. The 
experience since 1979-80 has bee mixed, but the growth rates have been rather low 
through the Eighties and the Nineties. The trends in income distribution and poverty 
varied directly with the agricultural growth rates, especially when they were in excess of 
the thresh-hold level of 4.5-5.0 percent per annum. In general, a growth rate of 5.0 
percent or higher has induced positive changes in income distribution and poverty. In 
view of this positive association, the pursuit of a high growth policy in agriculture 
should guide Pakistan’s future development strategy. The efficiency of resource use, a 
greater dependence on modern technologies, and a minimisation of government 
intervention in the market mechanism are the essential pillars of the high growth 
strategy, which has the following as its elements. 
Firstly, technological change is at the heart of a high growth-strategy. To this end, 
there is need to evolve new HYVs of crops, new breeds of livestock and to develop new 
cultural practices. To accomplish these tasks effectively, the importance of greater Chaudhry and Chaudhry  608 
expenditure on research can hardly be underestimated. 
Secondly, from the growth maximisation viewpoint, the efficiency of input 
delivery systems should be enhanced. In order to check black marketing, underbagging 
and the sale of substandard fertilisers, pesticides and seeds, punitive action should be 
taken. In addition, efforts should be made to reduce the intensity of the problem by open 
market sales, by breaking up government (and registered dealer) monopolies, and by 
ensuring supply of inputs at the right price, time and place and in adequate quantities. In 
the case of irrigation water, an efficient use of available supplies must be ensured by the 
construction of storage dams, a continuation of water-course improvement programme, 
an equitable distribution of water across watercourses and the establishment of a direct 
relationship between the quantum of water delivered and the charges levied on its use. 
However, being a public good, the privatisation of the irrigation system, partial or 
otherwise, is not desirable. 
Thirdly, the government intervention in agricultural commodity markets should 
be reduced to a minimum. This follows from the fact that parastatals have widely been 
blamed for serving their own vested interests rather than the interests of producers and 
consumers [Bale (1985)]. However, such a policy should keep in view the fact that the 
experience with private traders in Pakistan has been disappointing so far [Naqvi and 
Cornelesse (1986)]. Thus appropriate laws should be framed to guard against illicit 
practices of the private sector to ensure fair play and competition in the agricultural 
commodity markets. 
  Finally, agricultural commodity prices should be raised to world levels in 
accordance with corresponding import and export parity prices to prevent an 
uneconomic (implicit) resource transfer from agriculture to other sectors of the economy. 
As procurement prices in Pakistan are still considerably below the world levels, raising 
them to world prices should revive incentives, investment and growth in agriculture. 
Even though the procurement price of wheat has been raised to Rs 240.00 per 40 kgs, 
the above statement would still hold as the average border price (cif Karachi) of 
imported wheat was in excess of Rs 310.00 per maund [Government of Pakistan 
(1996a)]. It is worth noting that this border price corresponded with an import parity 
price of wheat of Rs 360.00. 
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